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Sexual Stereotyping in
Partnership Decisions:
The Second Stage
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse
Reaches the Supreme Court
By Martha S. Weisel

Introduction

At first glance, gender bias and the professional
woman in accounting seems to be a contradiction
in terminology. Although there is a long history of
discrimination against the women
“pioneers” entering the
profession [Ried, Acken
and Jancura, 1987, p.
339], the barriers to
entry have eroded.
In the last fifteen
years, women have
entered into the
accounting profession
at an unprecedented
rate. More than 50%
of the women who are
CPAs have received
their professional
accreditation since 1980
[Stillablower, 1985, p.
22]. Today 50% of the
new accountants being
hired are women
[Heaney, 1988, p. 8].
Women accountants
are no longer seen
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as a rarity, and major accounting firms routinely
hire women into entry level positions where the
entry level salaries equal those of their male co
workers [Olson and Frieze, 1986, p. 28].
Although women have entered the
professions, certain
barriers remain.
Partnership status
has been particu
larly elusive
for women in
accounting.
Women repre
sented 3% of the
partners in the
Big 8 public
accounting firms
in 1986, as com
pared to 1% in
1983, a small
increase in light of
the growth in the
number of women
actually in the
field [Hooks
and Cheramy,
1988, p. 20].

In 1984, the United States
Supreme Court made its first
decision relating to partnership
decision-making. In Hishon v. King
and Spaulding, [104 S.Ct. 2229,
1984], the highest court determined
that professional partnerships fall
under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and that partnership
decisions should be evaluated under
the employment discrimination
law; that is, partnerships may not
discriminate on the basis of sex in
choosing partners.
The purpose of this article is to
examine the court’s most recent
decision involving professional
partnerships, Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, [57 U.S.L.W. 4469,
1989]. It is a case involving
important issues relating to gender
bias, stereotyping on the basis of
gender, and a professional woman’s
access into the upper ranks.
Hopkins is the first case dealing
with the methodology used by a
partnership in making partnership
decisions. The article has several
objectives including (1) the
development of the factual
background of Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse and an explanation of
the decisions of the lower courts; (2)
an analysis of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court; and
(3) an examination of the meaning
of the decision to the profession in
general and in particular to women
accountants who are on a
partnership track.

... gender bias and
the professional
woman in accounting
seems to be a
contradiction in
terminology.
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Background
Ann Hopkins was a senior
manager at Price Waterhouse, a
Big 8 accounting firm. At the time
that she was proposed for
partnership, she had worked at the
firm’s Office of Government
Services [OGS] in Washington,
D.C., for five years. She became a
candidate for partnership when the
partners in her local office
submitted her name as a candidate.
Of the 88 people suggested for
partnership status in 1982, Hopkins
was the only woman considered
[825 F.2d at 462].
After being nominated by her
division, Price Waterhouse
circulated her name together with
an appraisal from OGS to all
partners. Partners submitted
detailed evaluations of the
candidate if they were familiar
with Ms. Hopkins, while those who
did not know her well submitted
brief evaluations. The evaluations
indicated that Hopkins had a
number of strengths and
weaknesses. Clients appeared
pleased with Hopkins’ professional
performance. Staff members
indicated that “she was generally
viewed as a highly competent
project leader who worked long
hours, pushed vigorously to meet
deadlines and demanded much
from the multidisciplinary staffs
with which she worked” [618 F.2d
at 1112]. However, her
relationships with staff members
were troublesome, with both
supporters and detractors noting
“she was sometimes overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult
to work with and impatient with
staff” [618 F.2d at 1113].
Many of the negative comments
concerning Hopkins had a sexual

overtone. Critics suggested that she
needed a “course in charm school”
[825 F.2d at 463]. Even her
supporters reacted negatively to
Ann Hopkins’ personality because
of her gender, noting that “she may
have overcompensated for being a
woman” and that her use of
profanity, though no worse than
many of the men, was offensive
“because she is a lady using foul
language” [825 F.2d at 463].
The concerns of the Price
Waterhouse partners led to the
candidacy of Hopkins, along with
that of 19 male candidates, being
put on hold. Hopkins’ major
supporter, after the initial decision
to hold her back one year, advised
her “to walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled and wear jewelry”
[618 F.2d 1117]. All of the men put
on hold were renominated the
following year and 15 of the 19
became partners [825 F.2d 462].
Hopkins’ division did not
renominate her. At that point,
knowing that it was highly unlikely
that she would become a partner,
Hopkins resigned. Before
resigning, she discussed the matter
with one of the firm’s partners who
agreed with her decision.
The Lower Courts

Ann Hopkins brought her case to
federal district court, arguing that

Hopkins is the first
case dealing with the
methodology used by a
partnership in
making partnership
decisions.
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Price Waterhouse had
discriminated against her on the
basis of her sex. She argued that
she was qualified to be a partner,
that she was not selected, and that
Price Waterhouse continued to seek
partners with her qualifications
[618 F.2d 1113]. Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
plaintiff who meets these criteria
establishes a prima facie case of
employment discrimination on the
basis of sex. Once that is
established, it is up to the
defendant to establish that the
firm’s decision regarding the
plaintiff was not based on
impermissible sexual factors.
Price Waterhouse maintained
that it was Hopkins’ interpersonal
skills, not gender discrimination,
which negated her partnership
chances. The district court noted
that questions relating to
interpersonal skills were a
legitimate concern and that
Hopkins’ style “provided ample
justification for the complaints that
formed the basis of the Policy
Board’s decision (to put her on
hold),” [618 F.Supp. at 1114].
Further, the decision by her office

Partnership status
has been particularly
elusive for women in
accounting.
not to renominate her was,
according to the district court,
related to concerns about her
interpersonal skills rather than any
sexual discrimination [618 F.Supp.
at 1114].
However, the district court
distinguished between Hopkins’
interpersonal skills and the sexual
overtones of many of the comments.

6/The Woman CPA, October 1989

Ann Hopkins
Photo Credit:
Cynthia Johnson/Time Magazine

The court noted that other women
had been evaluated using sex-based
criteria, in that “[candidates were
viewed favorably if partners
believed they maintained their
femininity while becoming
effective professional managers”;
but “[t]o be identified as a women’s
libber was regarded as a negative
comment” [618 F.Supp. at 1117].
The evidence indicated that Price
Waterhouse gave a great deal of
weight to the negative comments
although “those comments reflected
unconscious sexual stereotyping by
male evaluators based on outmoded
attitudes towards women” [825
F.Supp. 1118-9].
The district court which heard
the testimony determined that
these comments were part and
parcel of the regular partnership
evaluation, that the firm did not
discourage such comments, did not
address the need to revise such
thinking, and in fact did not take
any action at all [825 F.Supp. at
1119].
The district court acknowledged
that such thinking could not be
quantified. However, it found that

although her interpersonal skills
were a legitimate subject of
concern, any analysis of her
interpersonal skills was tainted by
Price Waterhouse’s failure to deal
with sexism in its evaluation
scheme.
The lower court’s decision
highlights the two key issues
presented in Hopkins that were
eventually decided by the United
States Supreme Court. The
evaluation process was deemed to
be tainted and this produced what
is called a “mixed motive” issue. In
a mixed motive case, the employer
uses legitimate business concerns
in making an employment decision.
However, those legitimate concerns
are combined with the use of
impermissible sexual
discrimination. According to the
district court, in Hopkins there was
the impermissible sex stereotyping.
However, there was also the
legitimate business concerns
concerning Hopkins’ lack of
interpersonal skills. In such a
scenario, where the plaintiff
(Hopkins) has established that
impermissible factors (sexual
stereotyping) played a significant

Clients appeared
pleased with Hopkins'
professional
performance.
role in denying her a partnership
position, the burden shifts to the
defendant (Price Waterhouse) to
establish that the decision would
have been the same anyway.
For Price Waterhouse to meet its
burden, the district court required
that the accounting partnership
prove that its decision would have
been the same through clear and

convincing evidence. It should be
noted that the District Court had
determined that Hopkins had
already completed the initial prima
facie case, that is, that she was
qualified for the position, that she
was not chosen for the position, and
that Price Waterhouse continued to
look for other partners. At this
juncture, the burden switches to
the defendant.
The normal burden of proof
required for civil cases is
preponderence of evidence,
meaning that the defendant
convinces the trier of facts that the
defendant’s position is more
believable or more likely to have
occurred. The District Court
determined that Price Waterhouse
had not met this requirement, and
found in favor of Hopkins.
The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision
to shift the burden from Hopkins to
Price Waterhouse once Hopkins
had established her prima facie
case because the facts of Hopkins
involved mixed motives, one that
included Hopkins’ “apparent lack
of interpersonal skills” as well as
the “sexually biased evaluations”
[825 F.2d at 471]. The appellate
court agreed that Price Waterhouse
would have to prove that its
decision was not based on the
impermissibly biased evaluations
by clear and convincing evidence,
a burden that Price Waterhouse
did not meet.

of evidence that must be offered
by an employer in a mixed
motive case once an employee has
established sexual stereotyping,
and (3) level of proof required of an
employer in a mixed motive
employment discrimination case.
A threshold issue in Hopkins was
whether sexual stereotyping is in
fact discrimination in employment
decisions. Although Price
Waterhouse did not specifically
argue this point, the court noted
that by putting the phrase in
quotation marks “throughout its
brief seems to us [the Court] an
insinuation that either such
stereotyping was not present in this
case of that it lacks legal relevance”
[57 USLW at 4475]. The Court
rejected both hypotheses, finding
that forbidding an employer from
stereotyping an individual based on
her gender is just what Congress
had in mind in passing Title VIL
“An employer who objects to
aggresiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places
intolerable and
women in an
Catch 22: out
impermissible
they behave
of a job if
and out of a
aggressively

United States Supreme
Court Looks At Sexual
Stereotyping and
Burden off Proof

On May 1, 1989, the
United States Supreme
Court handed down its
decision in Hopkins [57 USLW
4469]. The justices looked at three primary
issues including, (1) what is sexual stereotyping
and whether it is legally relevant, (2) the type

job if they don’t. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind” [57 USLW
at 4476]. An employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive or that she
must not be has impermissibly used
sexual stereotypes in reaching an
employment decision [57 USLW at
4475].
The court noted that it is not the
remarks themselves which are
considered sexual stereotyping but
whether the remarks played a part
in the employer’s decision [57
USLW at 4476]. Sexual
stereotyping must be a motivating
factor used by the employer in
making its decision. To determine
this, the Supreme Court suggested
that a question be asked. “If we
asked the employer at the moment
of the decision what its reasons
were and if we received a truthful
response, one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or
employee was a woman” [57 USLW
at 4475].
In Hopkins, the partners’
statements went beyond mere
remarks. The evidence presented
indicated that the partnership
process required partners to make
written comments on candidates,
that a number of the comments
made about Hopkins were based on
sexual stereotypes and that the
Policy Board’s decision was based
on assessing these evaluations,
many of which had sex-based
overtones [Id. at 4476]. The court
noted that it took “no special
training to discern sex stereo typing in a description of an
aggressive female employee
as requiring 'a course at
charm school’ or in Hopkins’
major supporter’s advice,
that she could correct her
‘interpersonal skills’ through
makeup, clothing and jewelry” [57 USLW at
4477].
Having concluded that sexual stereotyping
is a form of gender-based discrimination that
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is legally relevant, the Supreme
Court accepted the District Court’s
conclusion that the comments of the
Price Waterhouse partners in
evaluating Hopkins showed just
such impermissible stereotyping
[Id. at 4475]. The fact that a
number of the comments were
made by supporters rather than
opponents did not change the
court’s decision.
The fact that Hopkins met that
threshold requirement, showing a
prima facie case of employment
discrimination on the basis of sex,
did not end the inquiry. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that
there were other factors present as
well, namely Hopkins’ inadequate
“interpersonal skills.” However, the
interplay between impermissible
sexual stereotyping and Hopkins’
poor interpersonal skills is just
what makes this a mixed motive
type employment discrimination
case.
The Supreme Court began its
analysis of Hopkins by going to the
source, Title VII, stating that:

“[i]n passing Title VII,
Congress made the simple but
momentous announcement that
sex, race, religion, and national
origin are not relevant to the
selection, evaluation, or
compensation of employees.
Yet, the statute does not
purport to limit the other
qualities and characteristics
that employers MAY take into
account in making employment
decisions,” [57 USLW at 4472].
Hopkins argued that Price
Waterhouse’s decision not to make
her a partner was based on her
gender. She argued that once an
employee establishes that her
gender played a part in an
employer’s decision, which she had
done, the employer may not avoid
liability under Title VII. In
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contrast, Price Waterhouse argued
that an employer is liable under
Title VII only if the employer’s
decision “gives decisive
consideration to an employee’s
gender ... in making a decision
that affects that employee” [Id. at
4472]. Price Waterhouse argued
that it is up to the employee to
establish not just that gender
figured into the employer’s
decision-making process, but that
the employer’s decision would have
been different if gender had not
been considered. The Supreme
Court concluded that both sides’
views were somewhat distorted.
Price Waterhouse argued that
Title VII meant that the plaintiff
must establish that the
partnership’s decision would have
been different “but-for” the use of
gender in making the decision. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that “[t]he critical inquiry ... is
whether gender was a factor in the
employment decision AT THE
MOMENT IT WAS MADE” [57
USLW at 4473]. Further, the court
noted that gender had only to be
one factor that was considered by
the partnership in making its
decision, not that it had to be the
only factor considered in making
its decision.

The Supreme Court noted that
“while an employer may not take
gender into account in making an
employment decision, ... it is free
to decide against a woman for other
reasons” [Id. at 4473]. Here,
Hopkins established that the
partnership decision-making
process was tainted by the
evaluations which used
stereotypical concepts of women
against her candidacy, an
impermissible concern. However,
the lower court also found that
there were legitimate concerns
about Hopkins’ inability to relate to
lower-level employees.

Where an employer has mixed
motives in making its decision, the
Supreme Court concluded that the
employer must carry the burden of
justifying its ultimate decision [57
USLW at 4475]. The court refused
to require a woman who has
established that gender played a
role in an employment decision to
also establish that the decision
would have been different had
gender not been considered. That is
an obligation that falls on
employers. The employee has the
prima facie responsibility of
establishing that gender was a
motivating factor in making an
employment decision, which
Hopkins met. Having done so, the
burden shifts to the employer to
establish that the decision would
have been the same even if gender
had not been considered. The
Supreme Court rejected Hopkins’
contention that once she established
that sexual stereotyping was used
in the partnership decision-making
process, Price Waterhouse was
liable under Title VII.
The Supreme Court rejected the
lower court’s decision to require
Price Waterhouse to prove that its
decision would have been the same
absent any gender-based
evaluations by clear and convincing
evidence. The highest court
determined that such a
requirement was not necessary in
this type of employment
discrimination case. Just what does
Price Waterhouse have to establish
to show that its decision not to
make Hopkins a partner would be
the same even if no gender-based
information were used? The
Supreme Court determined that
the employer need only prove his
position through a preponderance
of evidence, the evidentiary
standard which is normally used
for civil cases. Therefore, the

(continued on page 9)

Supreme Court remanded the case
so that Price Waterhouse has the
opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that its
decision would have been the same
even if the tainted evaluations were
not used.
Conclusion

In 1984, the United States
Supreme Court brought
partnership decision-making under
the ambit of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The highest
court’s most recent decision,
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,
articulates some of the standards
by which partnership decisions will
be reviewed by a court. As such,
the court’s opinion in Hopkins may
be viewed as a primer for
partnership candidates and their
employers. It is a mixed decision.
Women on partnership track can
look to the court’s decision and see
both positives and negatives. That
is also true for the professional
partnerships.
At the outset, women considering
employment discrimination
challenges because a partnership
has failed to make them partners
must be able to develop a strong
prima facie case. This must include
sufficient documentation that the
woman was qualified for the
position of partner, that she was not
selected for partner, and that the
partnership continued to look for
other partners after her candidacy
was denied. Ann Hopkins was able
to develop that type of record. Her
resume was very strong, both in
recommendations from her
colleagues in her division and from
her clients, and in her ability to
help generate business for the firm.
This is a first step in any
employment discrimination case
involving a woman who believes
that she was wrongfully denied a
partnership position.
Once a woman has successfully

met this initial hurdle that gender
played a part in the employer’s
decision not to make the woman a
partner, the burden shifts to the
employer. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Hopkins makes it clear
that although the employer may
have decided not to make a woman
a partner for reasons other than
gender, and that such reasons are
perfectly acceptable, once the
woman establishes that gender
played a role, the employer has the
burden of showing that the decision
was made for non-gender-based
reasons. Therefore, in Hopkins, the
burden is now on Price Waterhouse
to establish through the testimony
and other evidence that they

The Hopkins case sets
a precedent for
employment
discrimination cases
with mixed motives.
present that their decision was
based on Hopkins’ poor
interpersonal skills and not on the
sexual stereotyping that was
revealed in the evaluations.
A most significant point is the
court’s decision to require that the
employer meet its burden only by a
preponderance of evidence rather
than through clear and convincing
evidence, the burden that was
required by the lower courts. Clear
and convincing evidence is an
evidentiary burden which is much
more difficult for an employer to
establish. Hopkins determined that
such a difficult burden is not
required in these types of cases.
The Hopkins case sets a
precedent for employment

discrimination cases with mixed
motives. Sexual stereotyping is
legally relevant to such cases. Once
a woman develops a prima facie
case that gender played a part in
an employer’s decision, the burden
of proof shifts to the employer to
prove with a preponderance of
evidence that the decision would
have been the same if gender had
not been considered. Hopefully, the
case will heighten the awareness
that sexual stereotyping is
discriminatory. A positive outcome
the profession should strive for is to
eliminate sexual stereotyping in all
personnel decisions — not just
partnership decisions.
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